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REFUGEES

The Revised Refugee EO in the Courts II: The Flawed Maryland District Court
Decision
By Peter Margulies

Thursday, March 16, 2017, 12:34 PM

Today’s Maryland district court decision halting the revised refugee Executive Order (EO) exhibits the same marked lack of deference that
undermined Wednesday’s Hawaii decision (see my post here). Judge Theodore D. Chuang, a former Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
lawyer, made two questionable interpretive moves. First, Judge Chuang narrowly interpreted executive authority under a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(B), that Congress added to insulate executive action from undue judicial
intrusion. Second, like the Hawaii district court on Wednesday, the Maryland court broadly interpreted the Establishment Clause’s reach in
foreign affairs. Both moves pay insuf cient heed to the need for a measure of judicial deference to the political branches in navigating the
turbulent seas of foreign affairs and immigration policy.
The Maryland court interpreted the INA provision in a parched and parsimonious fashion wholly contrary to its text and purpose. The
provision at issue gives the Secretary of State latitude in determining “procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications” and the
suitable venues for visa processing. Congress passed this provision in 1996 (see Josh Blackman’s post here) to override a 1995 D.C. Circuit
decision that struck down a State Department policy barring the ling of Vietnamese asylum applications in Hong Kong.
The State Department had made the change after it concluded that the Hong Kong venue was encouraging unmanageable migration
patterns and frivolous asylum claims. The 1995 D.C. Circuit decision held that the venue change had violated 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(A), which
bars discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. The State Department measure clearly singled out Vietnamese asylum applicants for
more rigorous procedures, which almost certainly resulted in a greater risk of repatriation to Vietnam but also encouraged manageable
migration and promoted orderly asylum adjudication. In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, Congress in 1996 enacted subsection (B),
which gave the State Department exibility in visa processing to counter courts’ unduly broad readings of subsection (A). The Supreme
Court then remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit, which upheld the venue change as a processing decision that Congress had delegated to
the executive branch. See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Instead of viewing 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(B) as a limit on judicial intrusion into visa processing, the Maryland court read the statute in a
strained fashion that failed to heed its text or purpose. The court viewed subsection (B) as not permitting “temporal adjustments” to visa
processing, such as the pauses required under the revised EO. According to the court, subsection (B) allowed executive modi cation of visa
processing “place and manner,” but not “time.” This limit is painfully arti cial. Courts routinely view incidental restrictions on time, place,
and manner as appropriate in other contexts, including free speech. The authority to speed up or slow down visa processing is an integral
part of decisions on visas. Country conditions, such as the intensity of an armed con ict within a state’s territory, can and frequently do slow
down visa processing, as the government noted to the Supreme Court in the Vietnamese Asylum case. To be sure, a permanent and
pronounced slowdown in visa processing could be tantamount to a visa denial, thus triggering concerns about discrimination barred by
subsection (B)’s statutory companion, subsection (A). However, a relatively brief pause in visa grants does not rise to that level.
On the Establishment Clause front, the Maryland court’s holding echoed the Hawaii court’s rationale. The Maryland court conceded
that the six countries now subject to the visa processing pause posed “heightened security risks.” However, the court then blinked at those
risks, viewing the revised EO as motivated by anti-Muslim animus. As in the Hawaii case, the principal evidence for this animus came from
then candidate Trump’s campaign statements. However, the only case that the Maryland court could cite in support of using campaign
statements as evidence was the 11th Circuit’s 2003 decision, Glassroth v. Moore, involving Alabama judge Roy Moore’s installation of an
unmistakably religious monument to the Ten Commandments in his courthouse. Judge Moore could cite no neutral secular purpose for his
monument, and didn’t even try. In contrast, the “heightened security risks” that Judge Chuang acknowledged in the Maryland case deserved
more deference than the court displayed.
The Maryland court also stood deference on its head in a fashion warned against by Judge Jay Bybee in his dissent to Wednesday’s
Ninth Circuit denial of a rehearing of the government’s stay request on the original EO. Addressing the deferential “facially legitimate and
bona de” standard for visa denials that the Supreme Court set out in Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), the Maryland court cited the Ninth
Circuit’s view that the standard only applied to line-level consular of cers, not the “highest levels of the political branches.” This specious
distinction strikes at the heart of the rationale for judicial deference. If deference is appropriate for line-level of cials, it surely is
appropriate for senior of cials who are directly accountable to the public. That accountability drives the deference that the Supreme Court
has typically accorded the political branches in foreign affairs and national security. Reducing deference as of cials ascend in seniority
would authorize rampant judicial intrusions wholly inconsistent with the Framers’ scheme.

This doesn’t mean that deference should be absolute. However, a measure of deference is appropriate for the dif cult judgments that senior
of cials make in the dynamic realm of foreign affairs. That measure of deference allows policy disputes, such as the dispute about the
premises of the revised EO, to be resolved in the political branches, where such disputes belong. Judicial second-guessing is a poor
substitute for that robust debate.
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